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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a person who actively engages in a sham trans-
action with the purpose and effect of causing a publicly
traded company to make a materially false or misleading
statement of its fmancial condition has used or employed a
deceptive device or contrivance within the meaning of § lO(b)
and has thereby committed a primary violation of the statute.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici are law professors who study, analyze and teach the
federal securities laws and their role in regttlating U.S. capital
1 Counsel for respondents and for petitioners have consented to the
filing of this amieus brief. This brief was not authored, in whole or in
part, by counsel for either party. Sanford Svetcov and Susan Alexander of
the Leraeh Coughlin firm---other members of which are counsel of record
for The Regents of the University of California ("The Regents"), peti-
tioners in Regents v. Merrill Lynch, No. 06-1341, presenting the same
issue as is raised here, and counsel for The Regents in submitting a
separate amicus in rids case---have provided substantial assistance in the
preparation and submission of this amicus brief. The Leraeh Coughlin
firm paid for the printing of the brief.
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markets. A brief summary of their individual and collective
experience follows:
1. Professor James D. Cox joined the faculty of the
School of Law at Duke University in 1979 where he special-
izes in corporate and securities law. Previously, he taught at
the law schools of Boston University, the University of San
Francisco, Stanford University and at Hastings College of the
Law. Professor Cox earned his law degree at the University
of California, Hastings College of the Law (J.D.) and Harvard
Law School (LL.M.). In addition to his texts Financial
Information, Accounting and the Law; Cox and Hazen on
Corporations; and Securities Regulations Cases and Materi-
als (with Professors Hillrnan & Langevoort), Professor Cox
has published extensively in the areas of market regulation
and corporate governance as well as having testified before
the U.S. House and Senate on insider trading and market
reform issues. He is a former member of the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") Legal Advisory Committee and a
member of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") Legal Advisory Board.
2. Professor Jill E. Fisch is a Visiting Professor at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School and T.J. Maloney
Professor of Business Law at Fordham University. In 1989,
after obtaining her J.D. from Yale Law School, and two years
with the Justice Department and the Cleary Gottlieb firm,
respectively, Professor Fisch joined the Fordham faculty
where she serves as Director of the Fordham Corporate Law
Center. Professor Fiseh teaches corporations, securities regu-
lation and federal courts. She is chair-elect of the Section on
Securities Regulation and a former chair of the Section on
Business Associations of the Association of American Law
Schools. Professor Fisch’s scholarship includes work on
corporate law, securities regulation, and federal courts, that
have appeared in a variety of publications including the
Harvard, Columbia and Comell Law Reviews, and the Yale
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Law Journal. (E.g., Lawyers on the Auction Block." Evaluat-
ing the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 Colum. L.
Rev. 650 (2002).
3. Professor Donald C. Langevoort is Thomas Aquinas
Reynolds Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center. He
received a J.D. from Harvard. Prior to joining the Law
Center faculty in 1999, Professor Langevoort was the Lee S.
and Charles A. Speir Professor at Vanderbilt University
School of Law, where he joined the faculty in 1981. After
practicing for two years at Wilmer, Cutler & Piekering in
Washington, D.C., he joined the staff of the U.S. Securities &
Exchange Commission ("SEC") as Special Counsel in the
Office of the General Counsel. Professor Langevoort is the
co-author, with Professors James Cox and Robert Hillman, of
Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials, and the author of
a treatise entitled lnsider Trading: Regulation, Enforcement
and Prevention. Professor Langevoort has testified numerous
times before Congressional committees on issues relating to
insider trading and securities litigation reform.
4. Professor Richard M. Buxbaum received his law
degrees from Cornell Law School (LL.B. 1952) and the
University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law (LL.M.
1953). After practicing law for eight years, he joined the
Boalt faculty in 1961. He publishes and teaches in the fields
of corporate law and comparative and international economic
law. Professor Buxbaum has served on various state and
national committees engaged in the drafting of securities
legislation.
5. Melvin A. Eisenberg is Koret Professor of Law at
the University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law. He
received his law degree from Harvard in 1959. A~r
practicing with the Kaye Scholer firm in New York, and
serving as assistant counsel to the Warren Commission, he
joined the Boalt Faculty in 1966. Professor Eisenberg is the
author of The Structure of the Corporation (1997) and has
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published casebooks on the subjects of contracts and corpora-
fions. He was chief reporter for the American Law Institute’s
Principles of Corporate Governance.
6. Professor Hillary A. Sale holds the F. Arnold Daum
Chair in Corporate Finance and Law at the University of Iowa
College of Law, where she joined the faculty in 1997. She is
the author of numerous articles on securities and corporate
governance issues. Two of her articles, Delaware’s Good
Faith (2004) and Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism (2003), were selected by the
Corporate Practice Commentator as among the "top ten"
corporate and securities law articles published in those years.
She is co-author of the Securities Regulation easebook with
John Coffee and Joel Seligrnan, and is a member of the ABA
Committee on Corporate Laws.
The issue in this case is whether a person is liable under
§10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
§78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5) for
actively engaging in sham transactions with the purpose and
effect of causing a public company to misrepresent its finan-
cial condition, even though the person himself makes no
public misstatement. Here, the Eighth Circuit held that
absent "a fraudulent misstatement or omission," a person’s
deceptive acts as part of a scheme to defraud are no more than
aiding and abetting for which no private civil liability exists
under §10Co) in light of this Court’s decision in Central Bank
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank N..A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). In re
Charter Commc’ns. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (Sth Cir.
2006).
Amici, who have for many years studied the effect of the
federal securities laws on capital markets, are concerned that
such a narrow construction of § 10(b) could seriously impair
the integrity of our securities markets by precluding investor
recovery from those responsible for devastating losses caused
by fraudulent schemes with multiple actors, only one of whom
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makes a public misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals’
grudging construction is flatly inconsistent with the plain
language of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and with Central Bank
itself. Indeed, Central Bank cabins its holding to knowing
assistance through lawful conduct, but reMYmns §1003) liabil-
ity for "deceptive" as well as "manipulative" acts. 511 U.S.
at 178, 191.
As discussed in this brief, araici agree that actively engag-
ing in a deceptive scheme of sham transactions requires far
more than simply proceeding with a legitimate deal knowing
it will assist, i.e. aid and abet, others who misrepresent the
deal. But when there is far more, as in this case, then unless
investors can recover from any person who engages in decep-
tive sham schemes, the integrity of our markets will suffer.
These investors---and the markets~will suffer because cen-
trally and recurrently involved third party schemers will face
far weaker disincentives to avoid participating in sham trans-
actions which they know are at the heart of a company’s
fraudulent misstatements. In some cases, where the company
making misstatements is insolvent, such active schemers will
be the only source of recovery.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 10(b) makes it "unlawful for any person" to
"directly or indirectly" "use or employ" a "deceptive device
or contrivance" to cause economic loss "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. §78j(b).
Thus, according to its plain language, §1003) proscribes
deceptive conduct that purposefully causes a misrepresenta-
tion by a public company in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.
For nearly 40 years, this Court has recognized "beyond
peradventure" the existence of an implied private fight of
action for damages for violation of §1003). Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). In enact-
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ing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")
in 1995, with all of its procedural and substantive standards
for private suits, Congress effectively made the private right
of action explicit: "The provisions of this subsection shall
apply in each private action arising under this title that is
brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(1).
In Central Bank, however, this Court barred private suits
for aiding and abetting a §10(b) violation. 511 U.S. at 177.
Central Bank rejected a substantial body of circuit law that
had allowed private aiding and abetting actions under § 10(b).
ld. The circuits had long defined aiding and abetting to mean
any conduct that knowingly assisted or facilitated another’s
fraudulent misrepresentations, ld. at 170-71. Central Bank
rejected aiding and abetting liability under §10(b) because it
exposed secondary actors to liability based simply on their
participation in legitimate transactions, combined with reck-
less knowledge that a company would misrepresent or misre-
port those transactions. Id. at 168. This Court concluded that
such knowledge was insufficient to turn a party engaging in a
legitimate deal into a primary violator, ld at 190.
Amici submit that actively engaging (unlawfully) in sham
transactions and other deceptive conduct with the purpose and
effect of causing misrepresentations involves far more than
knowingly assisting through lawful conduct that Central Bank
released from the reach of §10(b). Actively engaging in sham
transactions is deceptive conduct designed to cause a com-
pany to make misrepresentations, and is distinct from ordinar-
ily lawful acts of omission or commission that merely aid
or assist another’s misstatements. Thus, both the deceptive
sham transaction and the subsequent misstatement constitute
"unlawful" primary violations of § 10(b).
Indeed, Central Bank itself reded primary liability
for "persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed
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activity." 511 U.S. at 176.2 This Court made clear that in
barring aiding and abetting liability it did not redefine "use"
of a "deceptive device or contrivance." Rather, Central Bank
affn’med primary liability for "acts that are.., themselves
manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of statute." Id
In so holding, this Court was consistent with its earlier
decisions affirming liability for deceptive conduct, as well as
for statements and omissions. Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972). In Huddleston,
for example, this Court held that an action under §10(b)
"extends to ’any person’ who engages in fraud in connection
with a purchase or saie of securities" even though they did
not themselves make the public misrepresentations contained
in the company’s registration statement that were separately
actionable under §11. 459 U.S. at 387 n.22.
Shortly after Central Bank, Congress enacted the PSLRA
and defined a knowing "’violation of the securities laws’" to
include, in addition to misrepresentations, any conduct that is
not a material misstatement or omission. 15 U.S.C. §78u-
4(f)(10)(A). Thereafter, this Court emphatically stated that
§ 10Co) does not require a "misrepresentation" by the defen-
dant. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002). Recently,
in Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005),
this Court again held that to prove a § 10(b) violation, plaintiff
must link its loss to "defendant’s misrepresentation (or other
fraudulent conduct)."
The deceptive conduct here is even more egregious than
Zandford, where only a single investor was harmed, because
here respondents conduct was designed and essential to
enable direct misstatements by Charter that injured the entire
market. Charter is liable under § 10(b) for the misstatements.
But, respondents who actively engaged in a scheme of de-
Emphasis is added, and internal citations and footnotes are omitted
unless otherwise noted.
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eeptive conduct, creating sham paper transactions causing
Charter’s public misrepresentations, should also be held
accountable as primary violators of § 10(b).
By implication, the Eighth Circuit appeared to acknowl-
edge that sham transactions designed to cause deceptive
statements may be actionable when it observed that §10(b)
does not impose liability on a party that "entered into an
arm’s length non-securities transaction" with another party
that uses the transaction to publish false statements. Charter,
443 F.3d at 992-93. The Eighth Circuit nevertheless pro-
ceeded to err in two discrete ways.
First, it recited but did not credit the allegations in the
complaint that the transactions were sham, illegitimate
"round-trip" deals with no value other than to falsely inflate
Charter’s publicly reported revenues: "Plaintiffs alleged that
the Vendors entered into these sham transactions knowing
that Charter intended to account for them improperly .... "
Id. at 990. The Eighth Circuit overlooked that plaintiffs’
complaint alleged that the vendors agreed to uulawfial kick-
backs and phony advertising fees that were complete shams.
(Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint,
¶¶7-11, 91-114). As this Court very recently reaffirmed,
"’Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance.., dismissals based on
a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.’" Bell
Atlantic v. Twombley, __ U.S. __, No. 05-1126, 2007 U.S.
LEXIS 5901, at *22 (U.S. May 21, 2007) (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
Second, the Eighth Circuit threw out the baby with the bath
water. Ignoring its own apparent distinction between arm’s
length and sl~am transactions, it held that a § 10Co) violation
included only a misrepresentation (or omission with a duty to
disclose) or a manipulative act (direct manipulation of stock
trading). Charter, 443 F.3d at 992. The Eighth Circuit’s
narrow definition of"deceptive" limits it to the "making" of a
misrepresentation, and thereby erroneously eliminates en-
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tirely any conduct constituting the use or employment of a
"deceptive device or contrivance" even though that language
plainly reaches activities that cause a purposeful misrep-
resentation. The Eighth Circuit’s narrow construction of the
statute was error under Affiliated Ute and Zandford, and
indeed under a proper reading of Central Bank.
ARGUMENT
I. Central Bank Bars Aiding and Abetting Liability,
but Reaffirms Primary Liability for Actively
Engaging in Deceptive Conduct that Causes a
Public Company to Misrepresent Its Financial
Condition to the Market
Central Bank did not reach--and does not limit--liability
of actors who engage in deceptive conduct with the purpose
and effect of creating a false appearance of fact regarding
the true financial condition of a publicly-traded company.
Central Bank expressly limited its consideration to those who
aid and abet fraud, rather than those who actively engage in it.
The Court itself circumscribed the issue it addressed:
"whether private civil liability under § 10(b) extends as well
to those who do not engage in the manipulative or deceptive
practice." Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 167. Indeed, the allega-
tion against Central Bank was based on a failure to act, rather
than on any active conduct. Id. at 168 ("Central Bank agreed
to delay independent review of the appraisal until the end of
the year," by which time the public building authority had
already defaulted). The Court reported that "Respondents
concede that Central Bank did not commit a marfipulative or
deceptive act within the meaning of § 10(b)." Id. at 191.
Central Bank explicitly distinguished between actors who
do engage---even indirectly--in deceptive conduct and actors
who merely aid and abet others. "[A]iding and abetting
liability extends beyond persons who engage, even indi-
rectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding and abetting liability
10
reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activi-
ties at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do." Id
at 176. That distinction is supported by the plain language of
§ 10(b), this Court’s subsequent decision in Zandford, and the
PSLRA.
A. The Plain Language of Section 10(b) Prohibits
Indirect A~ Well As Direct "Use" of a
"Deceptive Device or Contrivanee"Dand Thus
Proscribes Sham Transactions that Cause
Misrepresentations by a Company in Connec-
tion with the Purchase or Sale of a Security
The statutory language is "’[t]he starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute .... ’" Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring)). Putting the pertinent language of
§lO(b) side-by-side with the holding of Charter shows that
the Eighth Circuit rewrote the plain meaning of the statute as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly,
(b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase
or sale of any security . . .
any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [SEC]
may prescribe ....
It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly [but not
indirectly], ....
(b) To make or fail to make
by one who has a duty to
disclose [but not use or
employ], in connection with
the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipu-
lative device or contrivance
or a deceptive statement
[but not any other deceptive
device or contrivance] in
contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [SEC]
may prescribe ....
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15 U.S.C. §78j(b), cf, Charter, 443 F.3d at 992 (holding "A
device or contrivance is not ’deceptive,’ within the meaning
of § 10(b), absent some misstatement or a failure to disclose
by one who has a duty to disclose."). The Eighth Circuit’s
revisionist construction ignores the statute’s plain language,
its "commonly accepted meaning," and this Court’s reliance
on the dictionary to find that the common meaning of
"device" and "contrivance" include "a scheme to deceive."
See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 198-99 & n.20.
This Court previously rejected nearly identical logic from
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997). Referencing the sentence from Central Bank in
which the Court gave a shorthand definition of deceptive
conduct which could be construed as limiting such conduct to
misstatements or omissions (511 U.S. at 177), this Court
clarified that no such limitation was intended:
The Eighth Circuit isolated the statement just quoted and
drew from it the conclusion that §10Co) covers only
deceptive statements or omissions on which purchasers
and sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely.
It is evident from the question presented in Central
Bank, however, that this Court, in the quoted passage,
sought only to clarify that secondary actors, although not
subject to aiding and abetting liability, remain subject
to primary liability under §10Co) and Rule 10b-5 for
certain conduct.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664.
Without revision, the plain text of the statute makes it
"unlawful for any person,.., indirectly,.., to use or employ,
... any.., deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe."
15 U.S.C. §78jCo). As this Court held in Central Bank, "the
statutory text controls the definition of conduct covered by
§10Co)." 511 U.S. at 175. The Eighth Circuit’s requirements
of statements, omissions and duties simply do not appear in
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the text. The plain meaning of the words "any... deceptive
device or contrivance" necessarily includes conduct.
Following the plain text of the statute, the SEC’s long-
standing recognition of scheme and conduct liability in Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) is entitled to deference. Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979). Rule
10b-5 makes it unlawful for "any person, directly or indi-
rectly," "(a) [rio employ any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud" and "(c) [t]o engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person." 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(a) and (c).
Prior to Central Bank, this Court had expressly stated that a
defendant violates Rule 10b-5 when it engages in "a ’course
of business’ or a ’device, scheme, or artifice’ that operates as
a fraud." Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153. Nothing in Central
Bank changes that. Indeed, continuing to follow the plain
language of the statute, this Court recently held that to prove
a violation, plaintiff must "prove that the defendant’s misrep-
resentation (or other fraudulent conduct) proximately caused
the plaintiff’s economic loss." Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
B. This Court’s Decision in ZandfordmEight
Years After Central BankmAffirms Liability
for Deceptive Conduct, as Well as for
Statements and Omissions
In Zandford, this Court afffn’med that commission of a
deceptive act~ven one not accompanied by a public misrep-
resentation-is subject to primary liability under §10(b).
Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820. Eight years after Central Bank,
this Court held that "neither the SEC nor this Court has ever
held that there must be a misrepresentation about the value of
a particular security in order to run afoul of the Act." Id. As
noted above, the Charter case is stronger than Zandford
because here respondents’ deceptive conduct consisted of
sham transactions that purposefully caused a public company
13
to directly misrepresent its financial results and thereby de-
ceive market investors.
Beyond clarifying that deceptive conduct is not limited to
statements or omissions, however, the Court’s analysis in
Zandford explains that where the "aggregate" impact of an
actors’ conduct operates "as a fraud or deceit," those facts
support a f’mding that such conduct is "deceptive" and a basis
for primary liability under the Act. 535 U.S. at 820-21.
Where fraudulent purpose cannot be separated from the acts
themselves, primary liability is appropriate: "The securities
sales and respondent’s fraudulent practices were not inde-
pendent events .... Rather, respondent’s fraud coincided
with the sales themselves." Id. at 820. Thus, where a sham
transaction has the purpose and effect of operating as a fraud
or deceit on the market in connection with trading in secu-
rities by causing the misrepresentation of the true financial
condition of a publicly-traded company, the principals to that
transaction have committed "deceptive conduct," actionable
as a primary violation of § 10(b).
The SEC def’mes "a deceptive act" similarly: as "’engaging
in a transaction whose principal purpose and effect is to
create a false apace of revenues.’" See Simpson v. AOL
Time V~arner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (gth Cir. 2006). In
Zandford, this Court held that "[The SEC’s] interpretation
of the ambiguous text of §10(b), in the context of formal
adjudication, is entitled to deference if it is reasonable."
Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819-20.
As the Ninth Circuit explained, the analysis of whether
primary liability lies under §10(b) properly focuses on the
defendants’ own conduct: "the defendant’s own conduct con-
tributing to the transaction or overall scheme must have had a
deceptive purpose and effect." Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1048
(emphasis by the court). "The focus of the inquiry on the
deceptive nature of the defendant’s own conduct ensures that
only primary violators (that is, only those defendants who use
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or employ a manipulative or deceptive device) ar~ held liable
under the Act." Id. at 1049. "If multiple participants used or
employed a deceptive device in furtherance of a scheme to
misrepresent the reported revenues of a company, then all
participants may be viewed as having acted in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities." Id. at 1051. The
r~quiremem of reliance on the integrity of the market price is
satisfied because a misleading public statement is the in-
tended end result of the scheme. Id. at 1052.
Focus on a defendant’s own conduct is consistent with this
Court’s direction in Zandford, holding that § 10(b) "should be
’construed... to effectuate its remedial purposes’" (535 U.S.
at 819), and in Central Bank, holding that what §10(b)
"’catches must be fraud.’" 511 U.S. at 174. Thus, a de-
fendant whose own conduct has the purpose and effect of
creating deception in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security is properly subject to primary liability under
§10Co)--whether his own conduct involved a misstatement,
an omission, or some other device or contrivance that causes
a misrepresentation.3
C. The PSLRA~One Year Mter Central Bankm
Affirms Congress’ Continuing Intention to
Prohibit Deceptive Conduct
Congress demonstrated its intention to continue to prohibit
deceptive conduct as well as deceptive statements and
omissions in passing the PSLRA, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Star.
3 A recent district court decision highlights the risks of such an unduly
narrow conslruction of §10Co). The court held that the principal asset
manager of a group of mutual funds whose deceptive conduct was integral
to a fraudulent scheme and who even disseminated the fund prospectus
containing misstatements was not liable under § 10Co) simply because the
manager did not make the misstatements to the public that were the
product of the scheme. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., __ F. Supp. 2d j
No. JFM-04-818, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37923, at "5-’11 (D.Md. May
21, 2007).
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737 (1995). In addressing proportionate liability, Congress
revised the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and defined "a
covered person" under the Act in two parts. 15 U.S.C. §78u-
4(f)(10)(A)(i) and (ii). In part (i), Congress defined require-
merits for "an action that is based on an untrue statement of
material fact or omission of a material fact." Id In part (ii),
Congress defined requirements for "an action that is based on
any conduct that is not described in clause (i)." Id Congress
clarified that a "covered person" is one who "engages in that
conduct with actual knowledge of the facts and circumstances
that make the conduct of that covered person a violation of
the securities laws." Id
The statute must be read "so as to avoid rendering super-
fluous any parts thereof." ~4storia Fed Say. & Loan Ass’n
v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991). Section (ii) demon-
strates Congress’ intent to continue to make unlawful not
only misstatements and omissions covered by subsection (i)
but also deceptive as well as manipulative conduct. Had
Congress wanted to limit "conduct" to manipulative trading
practices as the Eighth Circuit did in this case, it could easily
have said "manipulative" conduct--but did not. See Central
Bank, 511 U.S. at 176-77 (If Congress wanted abettor liabil-
ity, it would have used the words "aid" and "abet."). By
broadly using the term "conduct" in the PSLRA, Congress
retained deceptive acts as actionable conduct under § 10(b).
II. Central Bank Rejected Aiding and Abetting Liabil-
ity Under Section 10(b), Def’ming Such Conduct as
It Had Been Cabined by Prior Circuit Cases to
Knowingly Assisting Another’s Misrepresentations
Through Otherwise Lawful Conduct, Thus Limit-
ing Its Holding to Those "Who Did Not CommR a
Manipulative or Deceptive Act"
Aiding and abetting liability under §10Co)~as it existed
prior to Central Bank--was conditioned on proof of three
elements: "(1) the existence of a securities law violation
16
by the primary party (as opposed to the aiding and abetting
party); (2) ’knowledge’ of the violation on the part of the
aider and abettor; and (3) ’substantial assistance’ by the aider
and abettor in the achievement of the primary violation."
Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621,624 (Sth Cir. 1985). Most
circuits followed this standard. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699
F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef
Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978); Schatz v. Rosenberg,
943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 652 (gth Cir. 1988).
It was in the context of this understanding of aiding and
abetting that this Court in Central Bank rejected abettor
liability and held that §10(b) required more. Indeed, in
reaching its decision, this Court acknowledged a similar con-
cem to that expressed by the Seventh Circuit in diverging
from the majority of circuits by requiring that the defendant
"commit one of the ’manipulative or deceptive’ acts prohib-
ited under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5" to be liable for
aiding and abetting. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes
& Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986); accord Robin v.
Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990).
Citing Barker, this Court explained that "the Seventh Circuit
has held that the defendant must have committed a manipulat-
ive or deceptive act to be liable under §10Co), a requirement
that in effect forecloses liability on those who do no more
than aid or abet a 10b-5 violation." Central Bank, 511 U.S. at
170.
Whereas the Seventh Circuit did not hold that aiders and
abettors could not be liable under §10(b), this Court could
and did. But, like the Seventh Circuit, this Court’s decision
in Central Bank was based on the concept that "the defendant
must have committed a manipulative or deceptive act to be
liable under § 10Co)" and that those who do not commit such
conduct "do no more than aid or abet" another’s violation and
are not liable. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 170. This Court
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required actual commission of a proscribed act rather than
mere "substantial assistance" and "knowledge" of another’s
primary violation. Id. at 190.
The critical distinction in Central Bank was between
conduct--generally legitimate business conduct--that simply
assists in the consummation of the transaction that harms the
investor, and conduct that is itself at the heart of the fraud.
Indeed, this distinction is crucial in separating aiding and
abetting conduct from primary violator conduct. In Central
Bank, this Court emphasized that plaintiffs did not allege that
Central Bank of Denver committed "a manipulative or decep-
tive act," and indeed had conceded there were no such acts.
Id. at 191. Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that the bank
assisted Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Authority’s
fraudulent promotion of bonds simply by knowingly delaying
its appraisal of the property that was security for the loan. Id.
at 168. In short, Central Bank refused to impose §10(b)
liability on actors who merely aided and abetted another’s
fraud by lawful conduct that knowingly assisted in the trans-
action’s consummation, as opposed to committing an unlaw-
ful deceptive act themselves. Compare Peat Marwick, 857
F.2d at 652 (financial statements certified by accounts were
not misleading, but the accountant held to be an aider and
abettor because its certification assisted issuer raising funds
from investors by touting a technology that the accountants
knew was not as represented by the issuer).
As Judge Kaplan explained in In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.,
376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), "an aider and abettor is
nothing more nor less than someone who deliberately
facilitates another’s primary violation. Central Bank fore-
closed liability for aiding and abetting the Rule 10b-5 viola-
tions of others, but the decision did not change the scope of
Rule 10b-5 or what constitutes a primary violation of it." ld
at 493. Actively engaging in a sham transaction with the
purpose and effect of causing a material misrepresentation is
18
a primary violation of § 10(b) because the person has used or
employed "a deceptive device or contrivance" proscribed by
the statute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Eighth
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